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GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, Commodity and Propriety: Competing Visions of
Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-1970. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997. x, 486 pp. $39.95.
In this impressive volume, Gregory Alexander analyzes property in American
legal thought as a dialectic between conceptions of commodity and propriety. As
commodity, property's primary purpose is to enable individuals to satisfy their
personal preferences. Law maximizes social wealth (and ultimately individual satisfaction) when it allows those preferences to be freely expressed in the marketplace. As propriety, property's primary purpose is "the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order" (p. 1). Property as propriety rejects
the subjectivity of value undergirding property as commodity. For example, property as commodity privileges freedom of disposition and exchange to satisfy individual preferences. However, property as propriety "is always committed to some
particular substantive view" (p. 3) from whose perspective property legitimately
prohibits the satisfaction of preferences. Moreover, propriety and commodity cannot collapse into each other. A proprietarian defense of the social order resulting
from unimpeded market transactions would have to provide a justification besides
the mere increase in social wealth or satisfaction of individual preferences.
Alexander rightly appreciates that he is working with very broad conceptions
that function largely as ideal types since "few, if any, American legal writers were
consistently and exclusively committed to one or the other" (p. 3). His narrative
recounts progressive accommodation of inconsistent visions that lawyers did not
necessarily perceive in competition. Jefferson, for example, was proprietarian

when he urged widespread agricultural holdings to secure the economic
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independence necessary to allow citizens to practice virtuous self-gove
Jefferson failed to reject property as commodity. He relied upon sym
on primogeniture and entail as the civic republican program of proper
instead of considering public restraints on freedom of disposition.

upon market exchanges and donative transfers were necessary to p
estate speculation and dynastic holdings from undermining propert
role in securing ordinary citizens' economic independence.
Meanwhile Hamilton, although more responsible than any other
before him for developing property as commodity, was also proprieta
redefined virtue as consistent with, rather than opposed to, self-in
environment where secure public debt securities functioned as capital,

unleashing individual ambition, creativity, and innovation wou

commercial elite whose virtue lay in talent and accomplishment. Fre
feudal vestiges of English property law, which fostered hierarchic
dependency and an aristocracy of wealth rather than talent, Hamilton
cial meritocracy would, like Jefferson's agrarian republic, reward virt
ently conceived-rather than wealth per se.
From this overall perspective, the book dissects the visions of prop
by exemplary legal thinkers during the ages of American property law

as civic republican (1776-1800), commercial republican (1800-1860
(1870-1917), and late modern (1917-1970). Each period's discussion b

a prologue about its characteristic legal writing. The prologues provide
the sources on which the book relies to trace evolving property discou
does that discourse unambiguously translate into decisions on concre

issues, but it sheds new light on how legal thinkers conceived the

between those issues and normative conceptions of property. The book

reader to subtle and original analyses of such luminaries as James
Chipman Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Morris Cohen and Robert L.

illustrate important themes in lawyers' evolving property theory.
The explanatory framework provided by the dialectic between pro
commodity, however, is more problematic than the book's compelling
more particular property theories employed in exemplary works of le
ship and in public debates over concrete property issues. The argumen
stant danger of falling victim to the book's appreciation of the nuances

torical texts because the categories appear so malleable that shifts w
approach threaten to overwhelm the significance of affinities between

an or commodificationist approaches. Alexander appreciates the pote
lem. He characterizes the commodificationist approach as essentially
3), since very different property regimes may satisfy its criteria. Mea
proprietarian approaches may reject values' subjectivity hardly mean
agree on the values that property law ought to protect. Uncovering pr
strands in lawyers' property theory emphasizes similarly between just
such disparate policies as slavery, strict limitations on inheritance, pate

its to married women's property rights, constitutional protection of welf

ments, permission of spendthrift trusts, elimination of spendthrift t
constitutional protection of vested rights, and narrow constitutional p
vested rights.

Consequently,
ity and propriety
Alexander offers
role as protecting

the historical significance of the opposition between
is broader than its role in any particular theory or p
his account to correct those who portray property
the market from democratic attempts to use propert
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Sharpening the distinction between commodity and propriety also requires
comparing those descriptive categories with others rooted in historical changes
within economic conceptions of property. The emptiness of the wholly commodified conception of property is an artifact of the marginalist revolution in economic
thought and the transition from the classical to the neoclassical paradigm. The latter sharply distinguishes between allocation efficiency and wealth distribution. It
concedes that efficiency analysis presupposes, but cannot itself justify, a distributional starting point defined by property entitlements. The neoclassical paradigm
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enables discourse about fully commodified property by abandoning any sen
proper social order besides that suggested by maximization of wealth and in
ual satisfaction. Still, it does so only by acknowledging its limits as a nor
framework for evaluating property's distribution. The neoclassical paradigm

resents a shift within economic thought away from the classical paradi
which market outcomes were not merely efficient, but also just becaus

rewarded people for the "true" commercial value of their labor. However, t
no break from tradition in lawyers' borrowing ideas about property from

ing economic paradigms. Lawyers whose economic assumptions requi

choice between wealth creation, individual satisfaction, and the material
tion for the social order could not have viewed the distributive conseque
those assumptions as embodying concessions to propriety.
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Alexander's demonstration th
proprietarian conception of property is part of our historical discourse supp
overt revival. Those who advocate a commodified view may properly und

that their progenitors were partial proprietarians only by virtue of earlier e

paradigms' limitations. Nonetheless, the book requires modem commodif
ists to confront proprietarian discourse when considering their view's hi
legitimacy. Reminded that earlier commodificationists considered property
normative perspective that allocational efficiency alone cannot support, thei
em counterparts should confront the limitations of their own perspective.
today's lawyers who conceive of property as commodity are apt to forget o
that claims about property's efficient allocation presuppose, rather than

property's pre-existing distribution.
Even if the book does not provoke lawyers to appreciate the limits of m

economic analysis, it will have a profound effect. By asking whether Am
have been content to conceive property as mere commodity, subjecting the
al foundation for the proper social order to the agnosticism of the mark
Commodity and Propriety establishes an important agenda for property sc
ship. Moreover, by tracing the view that "the purpose of property is not to
individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior nor
vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be structured"
the book outlines an important alternative that legal historians ignore at their
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